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This paper analyses three crucial research skills: problem identification, data 
collection and hypothesis-formation. It concludes that science research students 
should be taught about the creative process as science students are under 
pressures that can inhibit creative thought. They should also be taught the 
importance of tacit knowledge for learning how to do research, as this will aid the 
process. Styles of thought and language allow researchers to identify and solve 
problems and limit what the latter can be. Students may benefit from further 
knowledge of these, so they can understand why their interpretations differ from 
others and how to create truly original hypotheses. The paper calls for further 
research into the relationship between language and hypothesis-formation. 
 




In 2001 the UK Research Councils issued a joint statement of the skills they expect 
the doctoral research students they fund to obtain during the course of a postgraduate 
degree. The statement consists of seven categories of skills, namely research skills 
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and techniques (including problem forming and solving), research environment 
(including awareness of the commercial, ethical and international context of the 
research), research management (including project and resource management), 
personal effectiveness (including identification of training needs, independence and 
initiative), communication skills (including written and oral communication and the 
defence of ideas), networking and teamworking (including the establishment and 
maintenance of links with useful contacts) and career management (including the 
effective representation of skills and experiences through a CV) (Research Councils, 
2001). 
In 2002 Sir Gareth Roberts’s review of the supply of science and engineering 
skills in the UK reported that PhD students were not acquiring the skills they needed 
to fulfil their long-term needs (Roberts, 2002, summary of chapter 4). 
In response to the Roberts Review, the UK government made £29.4m 
available to the Research Councils to support skills development. As the money has 
filtered through, the HE sector has seen a proliferation of skill development courses 
for postgraduate students. The provision of these courses has been guided by the 
Research Councils’ Joint Skills Statement (JSS) and the Research Councils expect the 
students they fund to receive two weeks worth of skills training per annum. 
Nevertheless, most of these courses are focused on transferable skills (the last four of 
the JSS categories of skills) as opposed to research skills (the first three of the JSS 
categories). 
The lack of courses for the development of research skills does not mean that 
the HE sector is not developing these skills, but it indicates that we are probably not 
paying as much attention to their development. This paper will not argue for an 
increase in courses aiming to teach research skills. Its aim is to raise awareness of the 
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issues involved in promoting research skills, so that this may be done more effectively 
wherever it is done. 
The lack of attention being paid to the development of research skills is in 
some ways curious. There is a wide range of literature that considers transferable 
skills development and how to gain a PhD. Understanding of scientific research skills 
should also benefit from the work of philosophers, sociologists and historians of 
science. 
There is some work in the field of science education that draws on this body of 
knowledge. David Kaiser, for example, has tried to call the attention of those in 
science studies to the question of science education (Kaiser, 2005, p. 3), and he and 
Andrew Warwick have started to look at the insights Thomas Kuhn and Michel 
Foucault’s work can provide for the training of researchers (Warwick and Kaiser, 
2005). While the science education literature clearly recognises that history and 
philosophy of science is informative about the nature of science, it has mainly 
confined itself to recommending that it should therefore be taught as part of the 
science curriculum (see, for example, Kipnis, 2006; Matthews, 2000; Solomon, 
2002), rather than seeing it as a means to gaining a better understanding of how 
universities should be training researchers. 
More work like that of Warwick and Kaiser is required to integrate this body 
of knowledge with theories about learning in HE to form a coherent understanding of 
the development of research skills. In this paper, I aim to synthesise these ideas so as 
to analyse what some of the JSS research skills entail and how they can be developed. 
I will focus particularly on their development in science students because the wider 
range of literature on scientific research means that their application to science 
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students appears to be a good starting point for considering their development more 
generally. 
Furthermore, there is a particular need for science research students to learn 
how scientists practice. As Robert Bargar and James Duncan have argued, scientific 
work is often reported to have occurred in a manner that has been post-rationalised. 
This can harm the development of postgraduate science students in two ways. Firstly, 
it can prejudice them against apparently subjective thought processes that are vital for 
creative thought (Bargar and Duncan, 1982, pp. 2, 4). Secondly, students can become 
disillusioned with research because it is more complex and time consuming than they 
have been led to believe (Collins, 2007, p. 221). 
Social science research students already have to be reflexive. As Pierre 
Bourdieu has argued since social science is a socially constructed account of social 
construction, it must take itself as an object of study (Bourdieu, 2004, p.88 see also 
Bloor, 1991, p. 7). One aspect of this is to consider how the researcher himself 
impacts the research being done (Denscombe, 1998, p. 212). Science students need to 
have a similar awareness of how scientists practice, not to enable them to be self-
critical, but because it will help them to develop their research skills. 
The JSS lists 17 research skills. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider how all of these skills can be developed. I have chosen instead to focus on 
the three research skills that I consider most important: “the ability to recognise and 
validate problems,” the ability to “design and execute systems for the acquisition and 
collation of information through the effective use of appropriate resources and 
equipment” and the ability to demonstrate “original, independent and critical thinking, 
and the ability to develop theoretical concepts” (Research Councils, 2001, paragraphs 
A and C). 
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Analysing the skills  
 
The three research skills chosen from the JSS share a couple of characteristics with 
each other. Firstly, none of them are single, integral skills, when a skill is understood 
to be an ability to perform a function. They all involve the transferable skills of 
critical thinking and creativity. They also involve disciplinary knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, language skills and thought styles. 
The integral place that disciplinary knowledge has in these research skills 
immediately dismisses any possibility of generic courses replacing the learning of 
them in individuals’ own departments. However, while the knowledge content 
associated with these skills may be disciplinary, the process of developing them has 
some common features across disciplines. This process involves developing students’ 
tacit knowledge, learning how to create knowledge and the development of critical 




Unlike their counterparts in the social sciences and humanities, science research 
students rarely define their own research problem. Science projects usually involve 
expensive equipment and/or materials and so the application for funding is made by 
an academic member of staff before the university accepts students to work on the 
project for their research degree (Cryer, 2006, pp. 26-27). A science student may 
therefore be faced with the prospect of having to identify a new research problem for 
the first time when he wishes to apply for a postdoctoral position. As this is highly 
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likely to coincide with the stressful period of writing up and trying to complete the 
degree on time, science students may need a level of help and support defining a 
research problem, which perhaps seems incommensurable with their final year status. 
It is therefore important that their supervisors have a good understanding of the 
different ways in which problem identification occurs. 
When planning their postdoctoral work, students may wish to generate a 
number of ideas as to their next project, so as to select the most attractive to them (for 
researchers’ choice of problems see Brew, 2001, chapter 6). To enhance this process 
it is worth understanding a little more about creativity. Geoffrey Petty has described 
the creative process as having six stages: inspiration, clarification, evaluation, 
distillation, incubation and perspiration (Petty, 2007. For the importance of creativity 
to scientific doctorates and how it can be supported, also see Bargar and Duncan, 
1982). In the first of these stages a huge number of ideas are created. Postponing the 
evaluation of ideas at this stage enhances this process. The objective must then be 
clarified (to come up with a productive problem that can be worked on with x 
resources) and the ideas evaluated, such that good ideas are distilled out. Ideas are 
then left alone before the hard work starts on developing them further. 
This process is helpful in as much that it is worth knowing that the inspiration 
stage is helped by being relaxed and by postponing the evaluation of ideas until it is 
over. However, other tools often help this part of the process. For creating research 
problems, such a tool would be an understanding of the types of problems there are. I 
have identified six types of problem, though there may well be many more: 
(1) A theory from one area can be adopted and the problem is how to apply 
the theory in a new area. 
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(2) Two theories can be juxtaposed and the problem is the resolution of their 
inconsistencies. 
(3) A new discovery can be made and the problem is to consider the 
implications this has for the area. 
(4) An unexpected piece of data is reliably gathered and the problem is to 
explain it. 
(5) Nothing can be known about an area and the problem is to ‘chart the 
waters’. 
(6) An external demand is created for implicit knowledge to be made explicit. 
 
The evaluation stage of problem identification is interesting in as much that part of it 
involves validating the problems (a specific part of the JSS problem identification 
skill). Is the problem real, or does it rely on a misconception, or lack of information 
about existing knowledge? Is it meaningless, trivial or of real value to the scientific 
community? 
Evaluation, and validation, goes beyond this. Evaluation would also involve 
considering whether resolution of the problem is likely, given the resources available 
for tackling it. These feasibility issues are dealt with in the myriad of PhD handbooks 
that exist. They also consider the vexed issue of originality, which is another 
important consideration for evaluating potential research problems (see, for example, 
Sharp and Howard, 1996, pp. 24-42). Evaluation and validation also both involve 
consideration of how productive tackling the problem is likely to be. 
Michael Polanyi rendered the evaluation of a problem’s potential for being 
productive problematic. He claims that it involves foresight. He wrote: “To see a 
problem that will lead to a great discovery is not just to see something hidden, but to 
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see something of which the rest of humanity cannot have even an inkling” (Polanyi, 
1983, p. 22). This led Polanyi to refer to the problem Plato set, that a problem either 
involves us knowing what we are looking for, in which case there is no problem, or us 
not knowing what we are looking for, in which case we cannot hope to find anything. 
He claims that the solution to this is that we do know what we are looking for but 
only tacitly. 
Tacit knowing is defined by Michael Polanyi as knowing ‘more than we can 
tell’ (Polanyi, 1983, p. 18). He describes how tacit knowing involves attending from a 
proximal term to a distal term. The example Polyani gives is of a blind man, who uses 
his knowledge of how his stick’s resistance changes as he moves it to gain knowledge 
of his surroundings. The stick’s resistance is the proximal term, while the 
surroundings are the distal term. The blind man attends to the surroundings and thus 
gains knowledge he can tell about them, but he does not attend to the stick’s changing 
resistance and thus gains tacit knowledge of it. Polanyi describes this tactic 
knowledge as a subsidiary awareness of the particulars (the stick’s resistance) that 
enables the person to have knowledge of the whole (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 55-58). 
Polanyi does not analyse the tacit knowledge involved in problem-setting in 
the vocabulary of proximal and distal terms, which leaves me feeling discontented 
with his explanation. How do we gain tacit knowledge of the problem’s solution? The 
following is thus my interpretation of how Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge 
would apply in this situation. In the context of evaluating a research problem, the 
proximal term is the explicit knowledge that the researcher already has about the 
discipline. The solution to the problem is the distal term. The researcher is attending 
to the knowledge he has, but he has an awareness beyond this. To solve the problem 
then, he must make this tacit knowledge explicit by gradually changing the focus of 
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his attention. (Support for this interpretation comes from Polanyi’s contention that the 
theories we use to understand the world are interiorized and we attend from them to 
the world. (Polanyi, 1983, p. 17)). 
For this to be a solution to the problem, the researcher could not know he had 
tacit knowledge of the problem’s solution. This seems epistemologically problematic 
to me because no evidence could be brought forward for its existence, other than it 
being a logical solution to Plato’s problem. I am not criticising the concept of tacit 
knowledge here, as I discuss in the next section this is important to research practice. 
However, I am questioning whether researchers have tacit knowledge of problems’ 
solutions. Empirical research seems to me to necessitate that the solution is undefined 
prior to the research being carried out, because the researcher cannot know what 
results he will gain. 
As it happens there is another possible solution to Plato’s problem. It may be 
that we do not know what we are looking for but we are restricted in what we can find 
and thus can hope to find something. An analogy would be a blindfolded child trying 
to find something in a closed room. He does not know what he will find, and may 
walk straight past the nearest object. However, he is restricted by the room’s walls 
and what he can feel (air would be transparent to his touch). He may be guided by any 
noises objects made, but he would still need to touch them in order for the object to be 
found. The scientist is limited in what he can find to phenomena that he can make 
consistently reproducible, even if guided by other signs. He is limited in the range of 
his search, not only by the problem he has set, but also by his thought style. 
A thought style is a way of thinking that constrains an individual’s thoughts 
and perceptions, without him really being aware of its existence. It constrains what he 
considers to be an acceptable problem to explore and what he would recognise as a 
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legitimate solution. While this sounds negative, Ludwik Fleck defined a thought style 
as “[the readiness for] directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective 
assimilation of what has been so perceived.” (Fleck, 1979, p. 99, emphasis in 
original). An individual needs a thought style in order to be able to make observations 
and hypotheses – because it creates the rules as to what counts as an observation or 
hypothesis. 
Fleck continued on by writing: 
“It [a thought style] is characterized by common features in the problems of 
interest to the thought collective [a community sharing a thought style], by the 
judgment which the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods which it 
applies as a means of cognition. The thought style may also be accompanied by a 
technical and literary style characteristic of the given system of knowledge” (Fleck, 
1979, p. 99). 
A thought style is thus the tacit rules as to what counts as physiology, organic 
chemistry, quantum mechanics etc. 
Fleck has described how productive research experiments tend not to be well 
defined – the scientists do not know what they are looking for. However, they find 
something because their thought style limits the ways they can interpret their results 
(Fleck, 1979, pp. 86-92). We are starting to enter into a discussion of how problems 
are solved now, rather than how they are set. Further discussion of thought styles is 
therefore deferred to the section on problem solving. The important point here is that 
this solution to Plato’s problem does not involve tacit knowledge of the solution. 
Whether evaluation occurs via tacit knowledge of the solution or whether a 
problem’s solution arises from the restrictions rendered by the person’s thought style 
is an important question. If it is due to tacit knowledge, then students should be 
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aiming for well-defined problems. If solutions arise from their thought style, as I 
think, problems should not be too well defined or there is not room for the occurrence 
of unexpected phenomena. However, the less defined the problem the more 
demanding reaching a solution will be on the student’s hypothesis-creation skills. A 




Data will normally be collected through both a literature search (also important for 
evaluating the problem’s originality) and via experimentation. The literature research 
involves a number of transferable skills, such as library skills and note taking. By 
reading and relating the material to the identified problem, the problem is further 
refined. 
For a research student, the experimental set-up will probably come from 
papers or the individual’s supervisor. The instructions come in the form of words 
(written or oral), yet words can only represent the reality of doing such as set-up. Like 
any representation it is not complete because it is not the thing itself. Parts of this 
knowledge cannot be passed on through words but by watching other practitioners 
and copying them. Harry Collins has identified five types of knowledge about practice 
that can be passed on by personal contact rather than through language (Collins, 2001, 
p. 72). One of these does not apply in this situation: information that the practitioner 
does not want to reveal. However, the other four do: knowledge that neither party 
realises needs to be passed on, ostensive knowledge, unrecognised knowledge and 
uncognized or uncognizable knowledge (though Collins questions the ontological 
existence of the latter). 
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Knowledge that neither party realises needs to be passed on arises when the 
practitioner does not realise that the student needs to be told to do something in a 
certain way and the student does not know what questions to ask. Ostensive 
knowledge is that which it is very hard to represent through language – it is 
knowledge of how something feels or looks (the whole, which cannot be adequately 
represented by the parts focused on when a diagram is drawn). Unrecognised 
knowledge is knowledge that something is done in a particular way without realising 
its significance – in an experiment there are so many variables that the importance of 
some of them may be overlooked. Uncognized knowledge includes such things as the 
grammatical rules of your mother-tongue, which you would have difficulty putting 
into words. Here knowledge has been gained through practice and is passed on in this 
way. Some of this knowledge could be formalised, just as foreign languages are 
normally learned with explicit knowledge of the grammatical rules. However, the 
practice is never as fluid until the explicit knowledge is used tacitly in practice. 
Polanyi describes the process of making such explicit knowledge tacit as 
interiorization of the knowledge. For abstract knowledge relating to practice, true 
grasp of the knowledge is not in making it explicit but in its use. Polanyi claims that 
making the knowledge explicit will destroy its use in practice. In some cases, the skill 
will become better than it originally was when this process is followed by practice but 
in other cases the damage is irreparable (Polanyi, 1983, pp. 17-19). Lev Vygotsky’s 
finding that children speak when trying to solve practical problems backs this up. 
Children are learning how to problem solve – adults who are competent practical 
problem solvers do not need to explicitly think what to do. Vygotsky also found that 
children are less spontaneous when they can speak, thus explicitly knowing what to 
do inhibits the spontaneity that gives practice its fluidity (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 25-26). 
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The link between tacit knowledge and practice is strong. Practice involves 
doing therefore it is bound to include some ostensive knowledge. It also includes 
procedural knowledge, which means that the practice will be more fluid when that 
knowledge is tacit. Such knowledge must therefore either be learned or internalized 
(which is another form of learning) through practice. 
This means that learning how to do an experiment will require the research 
student to watch someone else practice and then try to copy them. Furthermore, 
Collins argues that the importance of tacit knowledge to research practice makes it 
important that new practitioners explicitly know; firstly how important tacit 
knowledge is as this will ease its transfer and secondly how difficult learning practice 
is or students will distrust claims that it can be done (Collins, 2001, pp. 81-82). 
 I teach a number of research students about the premises of research and how 
to develop their transferable skills. Not so long ago one of them reported to me that 
she was a slow learner. This surprised me greatly, as it was contrary to all my 
experience of her. I therefore asked her for evidence of this. She replied that it was 
taking her a long time to get the experimental set-up right. I asked if it had occurred to 
her that perhaps that is how long it takes to set up an experiment. She looked a bit 
uncomfortable and said “maybe” in an exceedingly unconvinced fashion. Learning 
that the development of practice takes time is an important lesson for new 
practitioners of research and, despite its simplicity when stated explicitly, it appears to 
be a very difficult lesson for them to learn. 
Gaining results is not just about being able to follow an experimental set-up, it 
also involves observation. All observations involve some form of interpretation. Fleck 
gives the example of “Today one hundred large, yellowish, transparent and two 
smaller, lighter, more opaque colonies have appeared on the agar plate” and asks how 
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the person knows they are separate colonies (Fleck, 1979, p. 90). There is also 
information missing: what the colonies felt like, tasted like etc. This information is 
judged unimportant, due to the fact it cannot be interpreted in the light of previous 
knowledge. 
Fleck does not see these assumptions as problematic. On the contrary, Fleck 
claims that what makes someone a professional scientist is that he makes the same 
assumptions as other professional scientists and he does so due to his training. This, 
communally shared, way of perceiving is a major constituent of a thought-style 
(Fleck, 1979, pp. 90-92). 
As Etienne Lave and Jean Wenger point out people learn to be a member of 
their community (and thus share the community’s thought-style) by participating in it 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). The focus again, is not on being taught but on observing, 




One of the most important skills a researcher must have is covered by the JSS’s 
requirement for researchers to be able to demonstrate “original, independent and 
critical thinking, and the ability to develop theoretical concepts” (Research Councils, 
2002, paragraph A). 
 Creativity is vital to hypothesis formation. However, because science is 
usually portrayed as a rational, objective process, students and their supervisors may 
view creative thought as inappropriate. It is therefore helpful to separate the 
generation of possible explanations from their later justification. Bargar and Duncan’s 
study of scientists’ autobiographies reveal that in generating possible explanations 
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successful scientists often use imagery, metaphors, analogies and hunches. 
Furthermore, insights often occur following hard work on a problem, when the 
researcher is consciously not attending to the problem in question (Bargar and 
Duncan, 1982, pp. 3-4, 6-8). Especially in the later phases of a research project, 
students can inhibit creative thought by trying too hard to come up with a solution. If 
they are not open to the insights that come from more subjective ways of thinking, the 
solutions they generate will be mechanical. 
 As in Petty’s description of the creative process, the evaluation of possible 
explanations should come after their generation (Petty, 2007). It is in evaluating the 
ideas that the student needs to use logical analysis to judge whether his ideas fit 
existing theory and provide rational explanations for the phenomena in question, not 
during their generation (Bargar and Duncan, 1982, p. 3). 
The researchers’ thought style will have a vital role to play in his evaluation of 
the possible explanations because it defines what a person considers to count as an 
explanation in his discipline. Part of scientific thought styles is that the explanation 
must logically explain the experimental results gained and fit existing ideas about 
how the world works. This conception of the world is what Thomas Kuhn termed a 
disciplinary matrix (Kuhn, 1970, p.184).  
What can be interpreted from an experiment is thus constrained by the 
person’s previous knowledge. Having constraints on how one can formulate 
hypotheses is a necessary condition of hypothesizing. Fleck describes the process of 
making a discovery as beginning with chaotic observations (based on the assumptions 
inherent in the person’s thought style). He will then grope for understanding and will 
only begin to gain any when he meets some form of resistance, which enables the 
solution to take form. To create a fact, according to Fleck, is to maximise thought 
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constraint, in order to prevent others from being able to interpret the data in any other 
way (Fleck, 1979, pp. 94-96). 
Another element of thought style is the meanings that words have. People 
belonging to different thought collectives understand different things by the same 
words. They cannot either agree or disagree because they cannot have the same 
thought (Fleck, 1936, pp. 83-85 and Fleck, 1979, p. 100). 
If words and language are part of thought style, they also constrain the 
hypotheses one can create. The work of Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Potebnya 
suggests that thought and language are linked (Vygotsky, 1978, p.33). Vygotsky’s 
findings are less that speech and language constrain thought, and more that they free 
people to think of things not present in their immediate environment and to plan 
actions (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 26). Nevertheless, while man may not be able to think so 
widely without language, the limits of language hinder us thinking beyond them. 
If nothing else, science demands that our discoveries are accessible to others. 
Our discoveries cannot be accepted without us being able to communicate them (at 
least to others within our scientific community). If the solution to our problem is 
unrepresentable in our language of choice, we must make the solution representable. 
This will firstly help to clarify our ideas to ourselves and secondly, enable others to 
accept, reject or modify them. 
The clue as to how to do this comes from children. Children learn to speak by 
first labelling objects and then, at a later stage of development, by synthesizing these 
objects through speech (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 32). The first thing that a researcher must 
do to make something explicit that is currently unrepresentable is to label it. An 
example of this occurring is in Thomas Kuhn’s attempts to describe science in terms 
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of normal science, paradigmic thought and revolutions. Kuhn described this by 
redefining the word paradigm. 
This example is interesting because Kuhn did not invent a new word, but a 
new meaning for an existing one. As Charles Bazermann points out, language is more 
than words. To understand each other, we must share an understanding of the 
meaning of words, and what they mean in the context within which they are used 
(Bazermann, 1988, pp. 302-303). Kuhn invented a label by creating a new context for 
the word ‘paradigm’ and defining its meaning within this context. 
By creating a label, Kuhn could describe complex ideas via the label, which 
enabled him to then explore how these ideas interacted with others. Kuhn did not get 
it right first time – as Margaret Masterman famously pointed out there were twenty-
one different ways in which Kuhn used the term ‘paradigm’ in his book, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Masterman, 1970, p. 61). 
This finding of a way through ill-defined ground is something that research 
students have to currently learn through practice. If we can increase our understanding 
of the relationship between language and hypothesizing we are likely to be more 
useful to students trying to grasp ideas just beyond their reach. Equally, knowledge of 
thought styles may help students to understand why their explanation of a 




The ability to recognise problems, investigate them and to create new hypotheses is 
far from simple. I stated at the start of this paper that these skills involved a mixture 
of transferable skills, disciplinary knowledge, tacit knowledge, thought styles and 
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language use. These processes are not yet well understood, and the more that we 
come to understand them the easier it will be for us to encourage students to develop 
their research skills. 
The practical implications coming out of this paper are the suggestion that 
research students are taught about creativity and the role this has in problem 
identification and hypothesis creation. They should learn the role of tacit knowledge 
in learning experimental practice, so that they understand that the key to learning it is 
observation and practice, rather than reading or taking oral instructions. They should 
learn how difficult it is to gain, so that they do not feel disheartened and lose faith in 
their ability to eventually make the experiments work. Students would benefit from 
learning about styles of thought, as this may help them to understand why they favour 
one explanation, while others favour others. Research students would also benefit 
from learning more about how researchers create and communicate original ideas. It 
may be necessary for us to understand more about this ourselves, before we can teach 
it to students. However, we can teach them how difficult it is to capture elusive 
concepts. This should lead them to expect revisions, but in doing so we must be 
careful that they do not lose sight of the fact that there will come a time when they 
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